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Direct and Enhanced Disclosure 
of Researcher Financial Conflicts 
of Interest: The Role of Trust 
Roy G. Spece, Jr.† 
Abstract 
In earlier writing, I recommended direct disclosure of major  
researcher financial conflicts of interest in per capita funding arrange-
ments—the practice of providing researchers with a fixed sum for each 
subject recruited and enrolled in a study. This Article adds a recommen-
dation for enhanced direct disclosure. The enhancement in the disclosure 
is a summary of why per capita and excess payments are being discussed 
and further includes whether the sponsors of the research and the 
researchers have claimed that there are no excess payments. The reason 
per capita payments are being discussed is because of the risk—with 
special caution when sponsors and researchers are not willing to claim that 
there are no excess payments—of introducing bias into researchers’ 
decisions regarding study design, implementation, and interpretation, as 
well as concerning whom to enroll or keep in studies. Researchers’ claims 
that there are no excess payments do not vitiate the risk of such pay-
ments. Nevertheless, a special admonition when sponsors and researchers 
do not claim the absence of excess payments would hopefully encourage 
them to eschew excess payments.  
My recommendations are required by the rights to bodily integrity 
and autonomy embedded in informed consent. Several arguments have 
been made against my recommendations, many of which relate to 
supposed effects on trust. My rights-based recommendations should not 
be rejected because of objections based on propositions that (1) are 
conceptually unclear because of a failure to unbundle different kinds and 
degrees of trust and (2) have not been empirically proven even where 
concepts are clarified. In some instances, the required strong empirical 
confirmation cannot be made because of practical or ethical restraints, 
including the fact that some of the necessary studies would require 
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invasion of the right to informed consent. Finally, I suggest and partially 
apply an organizational method to generate empirical questions and 
guidance for future research in this area. Even the few hypothetical 
scenarios addressed demonstrate how complex—and sometimes practically 
or ethically impossible—the empirical studies must be to adduce proofs 
sufficient to overcome the imperative of informed consent. 
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Introduction 
I was among the scholars who early, over two decades ago, called for 
direct disclosure of certain researcher financial conflicts of interest to 
subjects in clinical trials.1 “Direct disclosure” is defined here as disclosure 
to the subject as part of the informed consent process. “Indirect disclo-
sure” means disclosure to third parties, such as by posting on a public 
website.2 I argued in my earlier writing that subjects should be “told the 
mechanism [and source] of the funding (for example, capitation or block 
grant with a target enrollment), as well as the amount of funding.” The 
mechanism of compensation I focused on was “per capita funding” of a 
set amount for each subject recruited and enrolled in a study. Per capita 
funding is troubling because it risks inclusion of compensation beyond 
fair market value of the resources, goods, and services supplied by the 
researchers. It is a bribe of sorts.3  
 
1. David S. Shimm & Roy G. Spece, Industry Reimbursement for Entering 
Patients into Clinical Trials: Legal and Ethical Issues, 115 ANNALS OF 
INTERNAL MED. 148, 148 (1991) [hereinafter Shimm & Spece 1]; David S. 
Shimm & Roy G. Spece, Ethical Issues and Clinical Trials, 46 DRUGS 579, 
579 (1993) [hereinafter Shimm & Spece 2]; David S. Shimm & Roy G. 
Spece, Conflict of Interest and Informed Consent in Industry-Sponsored 
Clinical Trials, 12 J. LEGAL MED. 477, 510–11 (1991) [hereinafter Shimm & 
Spece 3].  
2. See discussion infra Part II regarding indirect disclosure. 
3. Shimm & Spece 1, supra note 1, at 149; Shimm & Spece 3, supra note 1, at 
511.  
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The problematic nature of per capita funding is apparent from an 
example. Thomas Parham was enrolled in a clinical study despite having 
a heart condition that should have excluded him.4 His physician was 
paid a generous sum for each subject enrolled in the study.5 Toward the 
beginning of the study, Parham had symptoms that indicated that his 
heart condition was deteriorating, but his physician ignored the prob-
lem.6 Weeks later, Parham was hospitalized and required a pacemaker.7 
At least as far as appearance is concerned, it is easy to believe that a 
conflict in the form of per capita payments caused the physician to 
enroll and continue Parham in the study despite the risks to his health.8 
My earlier recommendation that financial conflicts of interest (focus-
ing on per capita funding) should be directly disclosed to subjects was 
based on historical aspects of human experimentation, the dynamics of 
privately funded human subjects research, and, primarily, rights to 
autonomy and bodily integrity embedded in and supported by the 
pertinent case law, statutory law, and commentary regarding informed 
consent in clinical practice and research.9 In a legal context, this leads to 
the conclusion that direct disclosure is required by the right to informed 
consent. The core justification of the earlier recommendations was based 
on a nonconsequentialist moral framework concerning each subject’s—
indeed, all persons’—presumptive individual rights.10 The present Article 
takes these rights as given and is based on the same moral foundation. 
But, being a moral pluralist of sorts, I believe that consequences are 
morally material. I agree that strong empirical proof demonstrating the 
high likelihood of significant harm and little good resulting from direct 
disclosure might overcome a presumption in favor of subjects’ individual 
rights to bodily integrity and autonomy in decision making.11 The 
strength of empirical proof required to overcome subjects’ rights in this 
or any context is a normative question.12 Thus, my necessarily normative 
answer to that question is that the required empirical proof must be 
established beyond a reasonable doubt. I also doubt that this level of 
proof can be achieved outside of direct or field studies, as opposed to 
experimental ones. The nature of the researcher-subject relationship and 
 
4. Kurt Eichenwald & Gina Kolata, Drug Trials Hide Conflicts for Doctors, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 1999, at A1. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Id. 
9. Shimm & Spece 3, supra note 1, at 510–11. 
10. Id. 
11. Here I do not address a possible “right to know.”  
12. ROBERT LAWLESS ET AL., EMPIRICAL METHODS IN LAW 21 (2009). 
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the subject’s usual sick role cut against establishing empirical proposi-
tions beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of the primary arguments 
against direct disclosure are based on empirical assertions about the 
effects of disclosure on subjects’ “trust” in researchers.  
This Article will show that currently there is no strong empirical proof 
of direct disclosure’s effects on subjects’ trust in their researchers that 
would overcome the presumption in favor of individual rights. Direct (or 
“field”) studies that would be needed to adduce strong proof of effects on 
trust that would overcome the presumption in favor of individual rights 
would require that up to fifty percent of subjects be denied the very 
information required by their rights to bodily integrity and autonomy. It 
seems that the only studies that can be ethically practically undertaken 
are vignette or mock studies, also known as “experimental studies,” such 
as the one done by Weinfurt and his colleagues addressed later in this 
Article.13 Whether experimental or field studies are in question, both are 
subject to the criticism here regarding the insufficient probing of “trust.” 
Disclosure is needed now more than ever. The amount of research 
and the percentage of it that is privately funded have increased tremen-
dously during the last two decades. There is no reason that this growth 
is not matched by a proportionate increase in the number of conflicts. In 
fact, conflicts are now not only more numerous proportionately, but even 
more likely to occur as a percentage of all cases. For example, consider 
the probability that companies will be under more pressure to recruit 
and enroll subjects from what is now a proportionately smaller pool of 
candidates (given growth in research). This might lead them to use per 
capita funding more often and to offer compensation in excess of fair 
market value to entice researchers to stretch rules and norms past their 
limits when recruiting and enrolling subjects. They would surely attempt 
to hide any excess payments within seemingly legitimate budget items 
such as “administrative fees.” Examples of researcher misconduct would 
include making misleading statements to recruit subjects or failing to 
honor protocols concerning who are proper subjects. Furthermore, much 
of the privately funded research has moved from the academic setting to 
the offices and clinics of physicians in private practice.14 This arguably has 
exacerbated researcher conflicts of interest caused by exchanges of value 
between pharmaceutical companies and researchers. For example, pay-
ments in the academic setting are distributed through units having a 
 
13. Jeremy Sugarman, Data, Policies And Conflicts Of Interest in Research, 6 
ST. LOUIS U. J. OF HEALTH LAW & POL’Y 69, 74-75 (2012) (discussing a 
multi-year study funded by NIH in which it was found impossible to nest a 
study of disclosure of financial conflicts of interest in an actual clinical 
study). 
14. KATHLEEN M. BOOZANG ET AL., CTR. FOR HEALTH & PHARM. LAW & 
POLICY, CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CLINICAL TRIAL RECRUITMENT & 
ENROLLMENT: A CALL FOR INCREASED OVERSIGHT 6 (2009) [hereinafter 
BOOZANG 1]. 
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managerial structure and several professionals (thus diluting the effect of 
excess payments on any one researcher), and academic physicians are in 
a culture at least intended to be conducive to high ethical standards that 
should counsel against acceptance of excess payments. In contrast, in 
non-academic settings, physicians receive payments directly and may be 
under little “environmental” or “cultural” restraint.15 
This Article has a circumscribed focus. It addresses researcher con-
flicts but does not examine associated institutional conflicts. It does not 
address the entire array of conflicts; it only considers disclosures of 
conflicts created by per capita payments.16 And it does not develop all 
the arguments for and against direct disclosure. Rather, it focuses on 
direct disclosure’s possible effects on subjects’ “trust” in researchers and 
whether particular effects argue for or against direct disclosure. This 
Article goes beyond my earlier work in that it recommends enhanced 
direct disclosure: summarizing the relevance of the conflict to the 
subject, with additional emphasis on when sponsors and researchers are 
not willing to claim that there are no excess payments. It would seem 
that an enhancement of disclosure would add to the likelihood of effects 
on trust.  
I. Enhanced Direct Disclosure 
An example of an enhanced direct disclosure that might affect re-
searcher-subject trust would be a requirement that subjects in studies 
funded on a per capita basis be told:  
This study is funded by Company X, which has paid Researcher Y 
$10,000 for each subject enrolled.  
[If true, add: “X and Y claim that these payments are not in ex-
cess of fair market value.” If not true, add: “X and Y are not 
willing to state there are no excess payments.”]  
This form of per capita funding (a set amount for each subject en-
rolled) risks payment to Y that exceeds the fair market value of 
resources, goods, and services supplied by Y to X. [If applicable, 
 
15. See generally id. at 13–15; KATHLEEN M. BOOZANG ET AL., CTR. FOR 
HEALTH & PHARM. LAW & POLICY, THE LIMITS OF DISCLOSURE AS A 
RESPONSE TO FINANCIAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN CLINICAL RESEARCH 5 
(2010) [hereinafter BOOZANG 2]; Mark Hall et al., Per Capita Payments in 
Clinical Trials: Reasonable Costs Versus Bounty Hunting Fees, 85 ACAD. 
MED. 1554, 1554–1556 (2010) (discussing the greater risk of bounty hunting 
fees in the non-academic environment and calling for research on whether 
excess payments are in fact a problem). 
16. The criticisms here regarding inadequate exploration and clarification of 
“trust” are nevertheless applicable to studies of institutional conflicts of 
interest and conflicts other than per capita payments (e.g., researcher 
equity interests in the research sponsor). 
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add: “especially when X and Y or those in similar positions refuse 
to state that there are no excess payments.”].  
Excess payments present the risk of biasing, in favor of X, Y’s de-
cisions concerning the design of the research study, whether and 
when to enroll or keep each subject, and how to determine wheth-
er the data from the study demonstrate [the studied intervention] 
is safe and effective.  
The early recommendations for direct disclosure have been embraced 
to a limited extent.17 For what it is worth, recommendations for indirect 
disclosures (e.g., to the public on a website) have fared better. For 
example, disclosure of basic data concerning virtually all exchanges of 
value from pharmaceutical companies to physicians in a broad array of 
contexts is required by portions of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act.18 These disclosures are limited, however, to delineation of the 
nature and amount of consideration on a publicly available website.19 For 
example, per capita payments to a physician-researcher would be posted 
by the amount of total payments without designating that the payments 
were made on a per capita basis. This “sunshine” legislation is not likely 
to serve subjects’ rights to autonomy and bodily integrity except in 
speculative or remote ways although it will provide data useful to 
researchers. Consider the example above concerning Thomas Parham. If 
the total amount of per capita payments in that case had been posted on 
a public website without designation of the per capita mechanism of 
payment, it is unlikely that Parham would have both researched for this 
conflict and understood what it meant. Probably not even an expert could 
have understood it. Its significance would not have been apparent without 
possibly futile research for further information such as the per capita 
nature of the payments.  
Scholarly commentary opposed to direct disclosure of conflicts is 
likely at least part of the cause of the limited support for including 
 
17. Shannon Benbow, Conflict + Interest: Financial Incentives and Informed 
Consent in Human Subject Research, 17 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. 
POL’Y 181, 206–16 (2003) (discussing a proposed federal law requiring 
direct disclosure but only insofar as determined advisable by an 
Institutional Review Board); James A. Christensen & James P. Orlowski, 
Bounty Hunting and Finder’s Fees, 27 IRB: ETHICS & HUMAN RES. 16, 18 
(2005) (explaining that disclosure must be made to an Institutional Review 
Board which should then decide whether there should be direct disclosure 
to subjects); Jammi N. Rao & L. J. Sant Cassia, Ethics of Undisclosed 
Payments to Doctors Recruiting Payments in Clinical Trials, 325 BRIT. 
MED. J. 36, 37 (2002) (asserting that consent cannot be informed without 
disclosure of payments). 
18. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,  
§ 6002(a)(1)(A), 124 Stat. 689 (2010).  
19. Id. § 6002(c)(1)(E)(i). 
Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 2·2013  
Direct and Enhanced Disclosure of Researcher Financial Conflicts of Interest 
415 
compensation information in the informed consent process even when 
there is growing acceptance of the need for indirect disclosure. This 
literature gives several arguments against direct disclosure, including 
claims that it would: (1) negatively “free” physicians from some ethical 
obligations through a conceit that disclosure itself is more than suffi-
cient;20 (2) increase trust so much that subjects would irrationally 
become too placid and would not sufficiently monitor researchers;21 (3) 
decrease trust so much that subjects would overemphasize the risk and, 
presumably, forego participation in possibly beneficial studies;22 (4) 
decrease trust so much that subjects who do enroll in a study would 
forego a chance to benefit from therapeutic effects inherent in the 
researcher-subject relationship;23 (5) confuse subjects, except those from 
a wealthy, educated elite who least need protection;24 (6) waste resources 
because subjects’ decisions would not be affected;25 (7) leave many 
subjects with no viable alternative, thus making disclosure gratuitous;26 
(8) cause institutions to be lax in their general oversight responsibilities 
related to financial conflicts on the assumption that the informed 
subjects themselves would make reasoned choices;27 (9) cause information 
overload and lead to subject confusion or inattention to more pertinent 
information such as physical risks;28 (10) not be necessary because of  
20. BOOZANG 2, supra note 15, at 12. 
21. Id. at 11. 
22. Id. at 13 
23. Id. at 11; Daylian M. Cain et al., The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse 
Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest, 34 J. OF LEGAL STUD. 1, 5 (2005); 
Don A. Moore & George Loewenstein, Self-Interest, Automaticity, and the 
Psychology of Conflicts of Interest, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 189, 196 (2004); DON 
A. MOORE ET AL., Conflicts of Interest Challenges and Solutions from Law, 
in MEDICINE AND ORGANIZATION SETTINGS 1, 1 (2004); MARC A. RODWIN, 
CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND THE FUTURE OF MEDICINE: THE UNITED STATES, 
FRANCE, AND JAPAN 215 (2011); Marc A. Rodwin, Physicians’ Conflicts of 
Interest: The Limitations of Disclosure, 321 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1405, 1405 
(1989). 
24. BOOZANG 2, supra note 15, at 14; Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl Schneider, The 
Failure Of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011) (attacking 
mandated disclosure in an array of contexts including the clinical research 
and practice settings, e.g., consumer protection). For a criticism of Ben-
Shahar & Schneider’s article as based on (1) false premises that disclosure 
fails insofar as it seeks to honor disclosees’ autonomy and to improve 
“naïfs’” decision making when dealing with “sophisticates” and (2) 
debatable normative assumptions that naïfs’ interests should supercede 
others’ interests, see Jeremy Sheff, Disclosure as Distribution, 88 WASH. L. 
REV. 475 (2013). 
25. BOOZANG 2, supra note 15, at 10. 
26. Id. at 10-11. 
27. Id. at 12. 
28. Id. at 13.  
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indirect disclosure or other protections;29 and, (11) not have any benefi-
cial effects.30 Several of these arguments against direct disclosure relate 
to effects on trust, and this Article will examine them exclusively. But 
first, an obvious question: what is “trust?”  
II. The Multiple Domains or Aspects of Trust, 
|Conflicting Research on Trust, And Why, Given the 
Current Literature, Trust Concerns Should Not 
Guide Decisions about Enhanced Direct Disclosure 
The central problem of analyzing direct disclosure’s effects on 
“trust” is that the pertinent literature does not sufficiently define the 
aspects of trust addressed in each study. Here, I will stipulate a broad, 
tentative working definition of at least the core of trust: trust is a 
favorable, subjective state of mind concerning another’s expected 
motives, intentions, propensities, competencies, or behavior. Beyond this 
working definition, I will expand on various aspects or domains of trust. 
I will not attempt a comprehensive analysis or taxonomy of trust. The 
existing disclosure literature’s failure to adequately define and probe 
trust and its various dimensions alone erodes the power of any findings 
to a degree that eliminates them as guides for policy.  
Trust is a multi-faceted concept that can be approached from many 
perspectives. For example, one can consider why a person trusts another 
person or an entity. Is it because of that person’s membership in some 
group (such as doctors), or is it because that person has earned trust 
over time through what is perceived as sound performance? One can 
speak of particular dimensions of trust: faith in another’s competence, 
veracity, or empathy. There are also levels of trust. For example, trust 
could be comprised of magnitudes of belief in the researcher’s overriding 
concern for the subject’s best interests. At its apex, trust might be a 
subject’s willingness to unqualifiedly submit herself to a researcher. 
Conversely, the lowest level of trust might be characterized by a subject’s 
complete mistrust in a researcher and consequent refusal to enroll. Above 
this nadir of complete mistrust could be ascending levels of trust: (1) 
that which a subject would grudgingly place in an adversary, probably 
causing a subject to carefully scrutinize each word and every action the 
researcher takes; (2) that which a subject would place in most people, 
probably motivating a subject to reasonably monitor a researcher; and 
(3) that which a subject would place in a close and respected family 
member, probably resulting in only a cursory monitoring of researchers’ 
decisions, representations, and recommendations. 
The best study relevant to the effects of direct disclosure of per capita 
payments on trust is a vignette or mock (i.e., experimental) study done by 
 
29. Id. at 11.  
30. Id. at 15.  
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Kevin Weinfurt and his colleagues.31 This article is instructive even though 
it addresses financial conflict of interest in the form of per capita pay-
ments to institutions and the closely related conflict of interest inherent in 
significant equity ownership by individual researchers. Even Weinfurt is 
not clear concerning the forms of “trust” his study addresses. He writes 
that his study concerns “trust in medical research.”32 To establish a pre-
study baseline of “trust in medical research,” Weinfurt asked subjects to 
rate their agreement with the following statements: “‘Doctors who do 
medical research care only about what is best for each patient’; ‘Medical 
researchers tell people everything they need to know about being in a 
medical research study;’ ‘Medical researchers treat people like “guinea 
pigs”’; and ‘I completely trust doctors who do medical research.’”33 These 
questions suggest different aspects of trust. The first question addresses 
what motivates researchers. The second question speaks to what research-
ers will disclose to patients. The third question relates to the expected 
behavior of researchers. The fourth question suggests a global form of 
trust that presumably would encompass the aspects spoken to in the first 
three questions. 
The question Weinfurt asked to reach conclusions about the effect of 
direct disclosure on trust in researchers and research institutions was: 
“How likely would you be to agree with the following statements: I 
completely trust Dr. Smith to do good medical research[, and] I com-
pletely trust University Medical Center to do good medical research.” 
Here, trust is faith in doing good medical research, but it seems that 
distinct elements of trust have been collapsed into the phrase “doing 
good medical research.” What does this phrase mean? It seems to relate 
most directly to the researcher’s technical competence as opposed to 
concern with subjects, but one can only guess. Even “technical compe-
tence” bears major ambiguities—competence in choosing a project; 
competence in setting up methodology; competence in mechanical tasks; 
and competence in monitoring, recording data, doing statistics, and so 
forth. We could address even more specifically—and very importantly—
competence to properly administer diagnostic tests and the intervention 
being studied; to properly enroll and maintain subjects in the study 
generally; to make enrollment, continued participation, and other decisions 
in the best interests of the particular subject whose trust is being meas-
ured; to fully inform subjects; to do all of the preceding; and more. 
Different dimensions of trust or different aspects of a single meaning of 
trust are inherent in the questions above. All these dimensions or aspects 
of trust are relevant to subjects, but to different degrees, often depend-
 
31. Kevin P. Weinfurt et al., Effects of Disclosing Financial Interests on 
Participation in Medical Research: A Randomized Vignette Trial, 156 AM. 
HEART J. 689, 689 (2008). 
32. Id. at 690. 
33. Id. 
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ing on variations among individual subjects. These dimensions of trust 
concern strength of belief in whether researchers are (1) making decisions 
in the best interests of the particular subject (thus protecting the subject 
across the board); (2) fully informing subjects (thus allowing them to opt 
out of studies); (3) properly administering diagnostic tests and the 
intervention being studied (consequently protecting the subject from 
injury caused by substandard care and maximizing the possibility that the 
subject might benefit from the studied intervention); (4) properly enrol-
ling subjects in the study generally (hence protecting fellow subjects and 
the validity of the study’s conclusions); and (5) competently designing, 
conducting, and interpreting the study to obtain good data (thereby 
reaching correct conclusions regarding safety or efficacy of the studied 
intervention). Of course, a global conception of trust would include all 
the senses of trust and provide all the protections in (1) through (5). In 
all of these, there are problems of combining different degrees of different 
variables. It is impossible to determine which, or which combination, of 
these five dimensions or aspects of trust that participants in Weinfurt’s 
study had in mind when they answered the questions regarding “doing 
good medical research.” Again, the current literature does not sufficiently 
specify which dimensions or aspects of trust should be, or most often are, 
studied. Consequently, the best I can do in this Article is to speculate 
about enhanced direct disclosure’s effects on various forms or aspects of 
trust.  
The ambiguity concerning what facet(s) of trust are being studied is 
one of the reasons that direct disclosure’s supposed effects on trust, as 
spoken of in the literature, should have little or no influence on decisions 
whether to implement direct disclosure. Because studies of direct 
disclosure offer no clear specification of which aspects of the complex 
mosaic of trust are being investigated, the findings about direct disclo-
sure’s supposed effects offer limited guidance at best and should have 
little or no influence on decisions whether to implement direct disclosure. 
This is a comment about the utility of the studies, not ultimately about 
the concepts being studied. A largely new set of studies and analyses is 
necessary before the literature achieves basic reliability. This is vividly 
illustrated by the fact that findings conflict as to whether direct disclo-
sure of financial conflicts of interest enhances or diminishes trust.34 This 
is a rather basic failure, and it is not merely empirical—it is conceptual. 
There has been a failure to recognize and sort through the serious systematic 
ambiguities of trust, which is reflected in its strikingly different—though 
obviously connected—dimensions. Thus, the utility of any supposedly 
“empirical” conclusions about direct disclosure’s effects on trust is ques-
tionable. It is also ironic that there are conflicting views concerning 
whether enhancement of trust is good or bad. On the one hand, for 
example, it can be argued that enhancement of trust will contribute to 
 
34. BOOZANG 2, supra note 15, at 13. 
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better subject participation or outcomes. Conversely, it can be argued that 
enhancement of trust will exacerbate the therapeutic misconception that 
the primary goal of a clinical study is treatment for the subject rather 
than scientific inquiry. 
Empirical investigation of direct disclosure’s effects on trust is also 
subject to the limitation that it is unethical to withhold disclosure from 
subjects in a control group. Obtaining consent to not being told would be 
impossible without either telling too little to obtain informed consent or 
too much to prevent biasing the study.35 
III. Focus on Enhanced Direct Disclosure of Per 
Capita Payments 
There is a working understanding among most policy makers and 
scholars that although per capita payments risk excess compensation and 
excessive or inappropriate enrollment, they should not be prohibited as 
necessarily involving such improper incentives in every case.36 I take no 
position on prohibition. At the very least, however, per capita payments 
should be treated as generally suspect, because they risk excess payment 
and consequent negative incentives for at least three reasons. First, it is 
relatively easy to hide excess payment in complex budgets. There are 
many complex variables that can affect the appropriate funding of any 
particular study at a specific venue and a dearth of research on the costs 
of conducting clinical studies. This makes it very difficult to prove excess 
payment in a given case.37 The risk is not vitiated even if the sponsors or 
researchers claim that there are no excess payments. Second, per capita 
payments also pose a high risk of excess compensation because they ignore 
the economic principle of economies of scale: the more subjects there are, 
the cheaper it will likely be to add each successive subject. When a study 
begins, it is uncertain how many subjects ultimately will be available. 
This uncertainty provides a ready excuse for not taking account of 
economies of scale when figuring actual costs. Third, as mentioned above, 
per capita payments can also improperly entice researchers to enroll subjects 
or keep them in a study when doing so is contraindicated. The allure of a 
 
35. But cf. the American Medical Association’s position that placebos cannot 
be ethically used without informed consent to their use. Anne Barnhill, 
Clinical Use of Placebos: Still the Physician’s Prerogative?, 42 HASTINGS 
CTR. REP. 29, 29 (2012). Although the AMA accepts the possibility that 
one can consent to use of a placebo without vitiating its “efficacy,” this 
possibility is not sufficiently strong, in light of the restriction on not 
disclosing matter that would bias the study, to overcome the presumption 
in favor of disclosure posited here to flow from the rights to autonomy and 
bodily integrity. 
36. Mark A. Hall et al., Per Capita Payments in Clinical Trials: Reasonable 
Costs Versus Bounty Hunting, 85 ACAD. MED. 1554, 1556 (2010).  
37. Id. 
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substantial set amount of money, say $10,000,38 for each captured target of 
opportunity is especially strong.  
In this context, my original call for direct disclosure of per capita 
payments remains important. I now also propose that direct disclosure 
include an explanation of how a conflict can harm a subject or the 
public. This is the enhanced direct disclosure mentioned earlier. Specifi-
cally, again, subjects should be told that per capita payments pose the 
risk of excess payments that might bias (in favor of the company 
funding the study) researchers’ decisions concerning the design of the 
research study, whether and when to enroll or keep each subject, and 
how to determine whether the data from the study demonstrate that the 
studied intervention is safe and effective. I make this recommendation 
for enhanced direct disclosure because otherwise subjects might not 
understand why they are being informed about per capita payments and 
risk of excess compensation. The enhancement of disclosure adds a 
variable that is not addressed in the studies to date. 
A. Five Variables Concerning Risks to Trust 
Although the literature does not contain sufficient information to con-
fidently predict the effect enhanced direct disclosure might have on 
particular forms of trust in any given study, it is useful to consider what 
actions might be best to take under a series of assumptions that enhanced 
direct disclosure increases or diminishes specified forms of trust. An 
adequate study requires attention both to the five dimensions of trust 
discussed above that are under investigation and to at least five variables 
that map onto the five dimensions of trust (or all of them together). These 
variables are: (1) the nature of the conflict; (2) the precise wording and 
method of disclosure; (3) the demographics of the subjects; (4) the setting; 
and (5) the magnitude of the impact on trust, if any (often itself the focus 
of empirical study). One can mix-and-match various combinations of these 
five variables in different hypothetical situations (sometimes with specific 
assumptions such as the subject’s affinity or aversion concerning risk) to 
generate specific questions for research and analysis. This is a heuristic 
formulation to help isolate questions and guide further study. 
I have just listed variables that need to be addressed in studies of 
trust and provided an organizational scheme to guide future research. 
Once the propositions that require empirical confirmation are identified, 
it can be determined whether some or all of them are amenable to proof 
 
38. Shimm & Spece 3, supra note 1, at 482 (discussing $2,000 to $5,000 
payments per subject in 1990 dollars); see also Benbow, supra note 17, at 
210; Rao & Sant Cassia, supra note 17, at 37; Christensen & Orlowski, 
supra note 17, at 16 (“It is now fairly commonplace for clinical researchers 
to be offered large sums of money ($5,000 to $10,000) for each individual 
they enroll in a research study, even where the investment of time and 
expertise on the part of the researcher is relatively minor.”). 
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in sufficiently powerful empirical studies that can be ethically or practi-
cally performed. If certain policy recommendations relating to trust can 
only be supported by proofs that either have not been made or cannot 
be made in the future because of practical or ethical restraints, those 
recommendations should not be pursued—at least not at this time. 
Consideration of the various dimensions or aspects of trust and the five 
variables identified above suggests the difficulty of adducing proofs of 
the effects of enhanced direct disclosure sufficient to overcome the rights 
to bodily integrity and autonomy that justify enhanced direct disclosure.  
In the remainder of this Article, I will venture representative appli-
cations of my organizational scheme, having already explained that the 
current literature concerning direct disclosure’s supposed effects on trust 
is insufficient to support any objections to direct disclosure. Before 
proceeding, however, I emphasize that the current literature is deficient 
because it neither specifies nor controls for each of the five variables 
above, and it fails to explain what dimensions or aspects of trust are 
involved or why researchers have reached contradictory findings as to 
whether direct disclosure enhances or diminishes trust. It is quite 
possible that, in some cases, “contradictory” results are not contradicto-
ry at all, because they involve different kinds of trust that are affected 
differently under different disclosure regimes in different settings. 
B. Some Partial Applications of the Suggested Guide for Future Study  
I will now apply my guide for further study to a few hypothetical sce-
narios involving the five variables and one of the many different 
dimensions or aspects of trust. The goal is to demonstrate how one might 
generate questions for study of the impact of enhanced direct disclosure on 
the various dimensions or aspects of trust. In each of these hypotheticals, 
assume the following: (1) that the conflict disclosed is the use of per capita 
payments; (2) that the wording, conveyed both verbally and in writing, is 
the enhanced direct disclosure delineated earlier; (3) that the setting is 
outside of academia; (4) that the demographic of subjects is primarily 
white, middle-class males; (5) that the aspect of trust to be studied is faith 
that the researcher will make all decisions with the subjects’ best interests 
being of paramount concern; and (6) that we have done preliminary work 
to determine a baseline of trust (in the stipulated sense) that would exist 
without enhanced direct disclosure against which we will judge any 
increase or decrease in trust. These assumptions allow the study of each 
hypothetical to center on the direction and magnitude of any effects on 
trust from the trust baseline without enhanced direct disclosure. 
For a first scenario, assume the subject has unqualified trust in the 
researcher’s commitment to the subject’s best interests to such a degree 
that the subject is prone to unqualifiedly submit himself to the research-
er’s representations and requests; the studied intervention is known to 
have serious albeit remote risks; and the subject is generally very 
guarded and risk-averse. A reasonable subject in this scenario might well 
decline participation, and without further probing resulting in infor-
mation cutting in favor of participation, the subject will probably refuse 
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to enroll. Nevertheless, his form and level of trust in the researcher as 
specified in this hypothetical might well lead him to automatically 
consent. Based on these assumptions, it would seem that trust in the 
form and level assumed would be bad because it would likely lead to 
unquestioning participation on facts that call out for skepticism and 
scrutiny. The questions for research derived from this case include: (1) 
whether enhanced direct disclosure of per capita payments enhances or 
diminishes trust in the form of belief that the researcher will honor the 
subject’s best interests; (2) if so, the amount trust will be enhanced or 
diminished and to what level will that put overall trust when computed 
along with any degree of trust without enhanced direct disclosure; and 
(3) how that will affect the subject’s decision making—e.g., will an 
increase in trust cause the subject to be far more deferential and to 
forego reasonable (never mind strict) review of issues likely to be 
material within her own value framework, or will a decrease in trust 
engender a desired level of skepticism. 
In the same vein, suppose that direct disclosure could, at least in 
some cases, attenuate trust with the effect of harming researcher-subject 
relationships and thereby lower the possibility of therapeutic benefits 
from a studied intervention as possibly potentiated by a high quality 
researcher-subject relationship. Probes of this possible deleterious effect 
would be extremely complicated and difficult even if one disregarded the 
ethical objection to withholding direct disclosure from persons in control 
groups. This is one reason that it will be very difficult for scholars to 
adduce empirical proofs concerning enhanced direct disclosure’s various 
possible effects on specific facets of trust.  
For example, assume that the positive quality of the researcher-
subject relationship has been shown to improve subject outcomes 
through the same mechanisms that have been shown to improve out-
comes when a placebo (inactive intervention) is prescribed.39 In this 
sense, improved quality of the researcher-physician relationship would be 
analogous to a placebo. “Placebo” might be expanded to include rela-
tionship quality, or, better, relationship quality effects could be labeled 
“placebo-like.” The common idea is that an element that is not thera-
peutically effective, independent from participation in the study, may 
affect outcome measures favorably. To be sure, a therapeutic relation-
ship is not a medicine, device, or procedure and is not literally a placebo 
(unless perhaps we are discussing talk therapy and its accompanying 
relationships). Now assume the project is to answer the following 
 
39. These are actually disputed questions. See Anup Malani, Regulation with 
Placebo Effects, 58 DUKE L. J. 411, 441 (2008). Moreover, the studies 
necessary to best establish the assumptions might be practically impossible 
or unethical. This is true for the same reasons that it would be practically 
impossible or unethical to judge the effects of disclosure on the quality of 
the researcher-subject relationship explained in the text following this 
footnote. 
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questions (put in the same form as before): (1) whether enhanced direct 
disclosure of per capita payments diminishes a specified form of trust; 
(2) if so, what is the magnitude of this effect; and (3) how the subject’s 
level of trust as modified by the direct disclosure will affect the quality 
of the researcher-subject relationship and consequent therapeutic effects 
(i.e., will it harm the relationship so as to negate any placebo-like 
effect?).  
Although the questions presented by the hypothetical study are im-
portant, answering them via the gold-standard of a double-blind study 
with placebo would require the following groups of subjects: (1) those 
receiving enhanced direct disclosure and receiving a placebo; (2) those 
not receiving enhanced direct disclosure but receiving an active experi-
mental intervention rather than a placebo; (3) those receiving enhanced 
direct disclosure and receiving an active experimental intervention; and 
(4) those not receiving enhanced direct disclosure but receiving a placebo 
rather than an active intervention. It is questionable whether such a 
study would yield valid results. All these permutations of disclosure 
would threaten the overriding purpose of isolating the effects of the 
active intervention as opposed to placebo or placebo-like effects. In the 
traditional physician-patient relationship, one could (in theory) deter-
mine the effect of relationship quality on outcomes without the 
confounding variable of using a placebo. However, the best experimental 
design in the researcher-subject context requires use of a placebo. 
Scientific consensus and legal regulation demand that efficacy requires a 
therapeutic effect beyond the effects of placebo.40 This would logically 
require that therapeutic effect from the studied intervention alone exceed 
effects from both a placebo and a quality researcher-patient relationship.  
Conclusion 
This Article explains that my recommendations are required by the 
rights to bodily integrity and autonomy embedded in informed consent. 
It also identifies several arguments that have been made against those 
recommendations. I have explained that many of the arguments against 
direct disclosure relate to supposed effects on trust. I have further 
argued that my rights-based recommendations should not be rejected 
because of objections based on propositions that (1) are conceptually 
unclear because of a failure to unbundle different kinds and degrees of 
trust and (2) have not been empirically proven even where concepts are 
clarified. In some instances, empirical confirmation in the required direct 
or field studies cannot be made because of practical or ethical restraints. 
 
40. Jennifer Kulynych, Will FDA Relinquish the ‘Gold Standard’ for New Drug 
Approval? Redefining ‘Substantial Evidence’ in the FDA Modernization 
Act of 1997, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 127, 127 (1999); 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 
(2012). 
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These restraints include the fact that some of the necessary studies 
would require invasion of the right to informed consent. Finally, I have 
suggested and partially applied an organizational method to generate 
empirical questions and guidance for future research. Even the few 
hypothetical scenarios addressed demonstrate how complex—and 
sometimes practically or ethically impossible—the empirical studies must 
be to adduce proofs sufficient to overcome the imperative of informed 
consent. 
 
